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If a tourist is accidentally injured while visiting Western Australia, he or she may seek 
damages in the tort of negligence. The Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) (CLA 2002), based on 
the Ipp Report, has altered the legal position with respect to such claims. This article 
examines the CLA 2002, and offers the tourism industry in Western Australia some insight 
into the effect of the Act. The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA) is also discussed. Cases 
referred to include Australian Safeway Stores v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479, Wyong Shire 





Fortunately most tourists and holidaymakers return 
home unscathed, but we often hear dire stories about 
visitors to an area who, for example, are lost in the 
outback, or who fall over cliffs, or who find themselves 
in difficulty in the sea or in rivers. 307 overseas visitors 
to Australia died accidentally between 1997 and 2000, 
mostly as a result of motor vehicle accidents or 
drowning.1 From this statistic it may be assumed that a 
great many more were accidentally injured. What is not 
always appreciated, however, is that one of the 
outcomes of the accidental event may well be litigation 
if the injured person, or a relative of someone who has 
died, wants damages to compensate for the loss or 
injury he or she has suffered.  
 
This article examines recent legislative changes to the 
law of negligence in Western Australia that will have an 
effect on the standard of care required of persons 
                                                 
1 J. Wilks & D. Pendergast, ‘Accidental deaths of overseas 
visitors in Australia 1997-2000’ (2003) 10(1) Journal of 
Hospitality and Tourism Management. 
involved in the tourism industry. The particular focus is 
on ‘occupiers’ liability’, that is, the liability of those 
responsible for the ‘premises,’ in the loosest sense of 
that word, on which the tourist incurred the injury. This 
is the liability, for example, of a local council or 
authority that has responsibility for the seaside, river or 
lake where a tourist drowns, or is injured in a swimming 
or surfboarding accident.  
 
It is the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) (CLA 2002) that 
has brought about the changes to the law of negligence, 
and the sections on standard of care came into effect on 
1 December 2003. There are as yet no decided cases to 
indicate how the courts will interpret these sections. 
This article will examine significant cases decided prior 
to the CLA 2002 as these decisions may give an insight 





Background to the CLA 2002 
In Australia the so called ‘insurance crisis’ brought 
about an explosive rise in premiums for some parties, 
for example medical specialists, and the absolute non-
availability of insurance coverage for others, such as the 
organisers of high risk social activities, including many 
that are tourism orientated such as trail riding on horse 
back or sky diving. The insurance crisis was blamed on 
the way in which judicial decisions in negligence cases 
had become increasingly plaintiff-orientated at the 
expense of the defendant, with the defendant’s deep 
pocket insurer suffering the consequences.2
 
In 2002, as the result of a series of meetings involving 
Ministers from the Commonwealth, States and Territory 
governments, it was agreed that there should be a 
review of the law of the negligence by a Panel of four 
persons, chaired by the Honourable Mr Justice Ipp. The 
focus of the Panel’s terms of reference was primarily on 
liability for negligently caused personal injury and 
death. The Panel handed down its report in two parts, 
one in August 2002, the second in September 2002. The 
report as a whole is referred to as the Ipp Report.3
 
The Ipp Report’s first recommendation was that for the 
sake of uniformity across Australia all the 
recommendations should be incorporated into a single 
statute to be enacted in each jurisdiction. While the 
universal single statute has not eventuated, some or all 
of the proposed changes have been adopted, or will be 
adopted, in most states and territories. In Western 
Australia the changes are incorporated, with some 
modification, in the CLA 2002. The Ipp Report made 
many recommendations, but only the ones enshrined in 
the CLA 2002 that are relevant to standard of care are 
considered here.  
                                                                                                 
2 J. J. Spigelman, ‘Negligence and insurance premiums: 
Recent changes in Australian law’ (2003) 11 Torts Law 
Journal 293. 
3 Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2002) Canberra 
(referred to as the Ipp Report). 
The legal requirement in a negligence action 
In the situation where a tourist or other visitor is injured 
on ‘premises’, the tourist is the plaintiff and the 
occupier of the premises, whoever or whatever that 
occupier may be, is the defendant. The legal cause of 
action underlying such ‘occupier’s liability’ is the tort 
of negligence. To succeed in a negligence action, the 
plaintiff must prove all of the following: 
 
• that the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of 
care (the duty of care); 
• that the defendant has failed to conform to the 
required standard of care (the standard of 
care); 
• that there has been material damage to the 
plaintiff (damage), caused by the defendant 
and which is not too remote.4 
 
Fleming defines the duty of care as, ‘an obligation, 
recognised by law, to avoid conduct fraught with 
unreasonable risk of danger to others.’5 The history of 
the duty concept shows that the courts have always 
envisaged that there must be a closeness between the 
parties, a relationship neatly crystallised in Lord Atkin’s 
‘neighbour’ speech in Donoghue v Stevenson.6 Lord 
Atkin said: ‘You must take reasonable care to avoid acts 
or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would 
be likely to injure your neighbour.’7 Almost without 
exception an occupier will owe a duty of care to a 
person coming onto their premises, so this element of 
negligence will not be discussed further. ‘Damage’ 
(caused by the defendant which is not too remote) will 
also be assumed.  
 
It is the standard of care that is most important in the 
context being examined here, because the issue is what 
the defendant should have done (or should not have 
 
4 Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co v M’Mullan [1934] AC 1, per 
Lord Wright, 25. 
5 J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (1998), 149. 
6 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
7 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580. 
done) to prevent the injury occurring to the plaintiff. In 
other words, what should the local council, or the 
statutory authority, or the person, have done to prevent 
the tourist being drowned, lost or whatever injury it is 
that is the subject matter of the litigation?  
 
Standard of care (how careful is careful enough?) 
This is the negligence part of a negligence action. Baron 
Alderson described ‘negligence’ as follows: 
 
Negligence is the omission to do something 
which a reasonable man, guided upon those 
considerations which ordinarily regulate the 
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing 
something which a prudent and reasonable 
man would not do.8
 
The history of occupier’s liability used to be very 
complex when it came to establishing the required 
standard of care because the standard of care varied 
according to the class of ‘visitor.’ For example, the 
standard of care required where a trespasser, an 
unlawful entrant, was injured was not as demanding as 
the standard of care required where the occupier had 
invited the injured party onto the property. In the 1987 
case of Australian Safeway Stores v Zaluzna (Zaluzna)9 
the High Court dispensed with these differing 
requirements, imposing instead the ordinary principles 
of negligence. In Zaluzna the plaintiff (Mrs Zaluzna) 
was injured when she slipped on a wet supermarket 
floor. The supermarket clearly owed her a duty of care, 
but the issue revolved around the basis on which the 
standard of care was to be assessed. In Zaluzna this was 
expressed as a requirement that the appellant 
supermarket ‘take reasonable care to avoid a 
foreseeable risk of injury to the respondent,’ i.e. the 
plaintiff, Mrs Zaluzna.10
 
                                                 
                                                8 Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Ex 781, 784. 
9 Australian Safeway Stores v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479. 
10 Australian Safeway Stores v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479, 
per Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ, 488. 
The situation in Western Australia is complicated by the 
fact that the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA) 
prescribes ‘the standard of care owed by occupiers and 
landlords of premises to persons and property on the 
premises.’11 In effect the legislation subjects occupiers’ 
liability to the general principles of negligence, but 
includes some guidance as to how the court should 
assess the appropriate standard of care and other 
matters. The sorts of factors to be taken into account 
include, for example, the nature of the premises, the 
extent of the danger, the age of the injured person and 
what was done to eliminate the danger.12 Since Zaluzna, 
however, it is likely that these are guidelines rather than 
directives. If they were to be treated as directives it 
would mean that the standard of care would vary from 
state to state, something that the High Court in the 
Zaluzna decision apparently intended to eliminate once 
and for all. Indeed it is Zaluzna and not the Occupiers’ 
Liability Act 1985 that is mentioned by the High Court 
in Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority,13 one of the 
seminal West Australian, and Australian, cases on 
occupiers’ liability and standard care. In addition, and 
as is often the way, the CLA 2002 apparently takes no 
account of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985, but in any 
event the later legislation prevails if there is any 
conflict. 
 
Before continuing with the specific requirements of 
standard of care under the CLA 2002, some particular 
aspects of liability under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 
1985 (WA) will be examined. 
 
What is meant by ‘premises’ and who is an occupier? 
The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA) defines an 
‘occupier of premises’ as being a ‘person occupying or 
having control of land or other premises’ and ‘premises’ 
 
11 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), Long Title. 
12 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(4). 
13 Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423. 
as including ‘any fixed or movable structure, including 
any vessel, vehicle or aircraft.’14
 
In a case involving occupiers’ liability, the defendant 
must be the occupier of the premises on which the 
plaintiff was injured. The question is, who has control 
over the premises? Sometimes this will be the owner, or 
if the premises are leased, it may be the tenant. 
Sometimes there may even be shared occupation.15 
Where there is more than one ‘occupier’, each may be 
required to contribute towards any damages awarded 
against either one of them.16  
 
Standard of care under the CLA 2002 
The sections on standard of care in the CLA 2002 are 
contained in Part 1A, headed ‘Liability for harm caused 
by the fault of a person’17 which came into operation on 
1 December 2003. Part 1A is broken up into various 
sub-parts, the most important ones in the context of this 
article being ‘Duty of care’ (Division 2), ‘Recreational 
activities’ (Division 4), ‘Contributory negligence’ 
(Division 5) and ‘Assumption of Risk’ (Division 6).  
 
Part 1A Division 2 is entitled ‘Duty of care’ but this 
appears to be a misnomer because it applies more to 
standard of care (breach of duty) than it does to duty of 
care.18 Section 5B, in Part 1A Division 2, sets out the 
requirements by which West Australian courts are to 
assess the requisite standard of care. Section 5B(1) says: 
‘A person is not liable for harm caused by that person’s 
fault in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm 
                                                 
                                                
14 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 2. ‘Person’ is defined 
in the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) as including ‘a public 
body, company, or association or body of persons, corporate 
or unincorporated,’ s 5. 
15 Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552. 
16 This is facilitated by s 7 of the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA). 
17 The CLA 2002 does not define ‘person’ but s 5 of the 
Interpretation Act 1984 (W.A) says: ‘“person” or any word or 
expression descriptive of a person includes a public body, 
company, or association or body of persons, corporate or 
unincorporate.’ 
18 Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2002) Canberra, 
102, clearly distinguishes between the two elements. 
unless …’.19 By thus referencing liability in the 
negative, it seems that the legislation is framed from the 
perspective of the defendant. The defendant need only 
take precautions against a reasonably foreseeable risk – 
and this is identified as, ‘a risk of which the person 
knew or ought to have known.’20 The test is that ‘the 
risk was not insignificant; and … in the circumstances, 
a reasonable person in the person’s position would have 
taken those precautions.’21  
 
The following factors, known as the negligence 
calculus, are then to be used in determining whether a 
reasonable person in those circumstances would have 
taken precautions: 
 
• the probability of the harm occurring; 
• the likely seriousness of the harm; 
• the burden of taking the precautions; 
• and the social utility of the conduct that created 
the risk.22 
 
From this it can be seen that standard of care is split into 
two parts. First, is the risk foreseeable? If it is 
foreseeable the second part, the negligence calculus, 
comes into play and this refers to what the defendant 
should have done to prevent the risk from eventuating. 
 
The reference to ‘a reasonable person’ indicates that 
objective, rather than subjective, standards apply: ‘in 
other words, the appropriate standard is not that which 
the defendant could have reached, but rather the 




19 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(1). 
20 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(1)(a). 
21 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(1)(b) and s 5B(1)(c). 
22 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(1) & (2). 
23 F. Trindade and P. Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia 
(1999), 436. 
While there may be some conservatism in future 
decisions as a result of the CLA 2002, this process of 
conservatism may have been under way anyway 
regardless of any legislative signposts.24  
 
Reasonable foreseeability – the problem area 
identified in the Ipp Report 
One of the leading, and most contentious, negligence 
cases in recent years is Nagle v Rottnest Island 
Authority.25 In this case the plaintiff, who did odd jobs 
and drove tour buses, became a quadriplegic after 
diving into ‘the Basin’ on Rottnest Island (an island off 
the coast from Perth). The Basin is a relatively shallow 
swimming area, with a mostly sandy bottom and some 
submerged rocks. The photo of the Basin, taken in early 
2004, shows a warning sign that was put up as a result 
of the Nagle case. Usually the water is clear, but on the 
day the plaintiff dived there was evidence that a glitter 
pattern on the surface may have reduced visibility of the 
bottom. The High Court found that the Rottnest Island 
Authority, the occupier, had been negligent in not 
providing an appropriate warning sign regarding the 
danger of diving. As discussed above, the defendant 
need only take precautions against risks that are 
reasonably foreseeable; the test of foreseeability used in 
Nagle being that the risk is ‘not far fetched or 
fanciful.’26 This test was one adopted from the earlier 
High Court decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt.27 
In Shirt the ultimately successful plaintiff (Shirt), an 
                                                 
                                                
24 On this see, for example, Department of Natural Resources 
and Energy v Harper [2000] VSCA 36; Prast v Town of 
Cottesloe [2000] WASCA 274 (Prast); J. J. Spigelman, 
‘Negligence and insurance premiums: Recent changes in 
Australian law’ (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal 291. In Prast the 
plaintiff was dumped by a wave at Cottesloe Beach while 
body-surfing, and the injuries he sustained rendered him a 
tetraplegic. His claim that the defendant Council did not have 
in place adequate warning signs failed at first instance and on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Leave to 
appeal to the High Court was refused. 
25 Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423. 
26 Nagle v Rottnest island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423, per 
Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, 429 (citing 
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, per Mason 
J, 48). 
27 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
inexperienced water-skier, was rendered a quadriplegic 
after a water skiing accident on Tuggerah Lakes in 
NSW. The plaintiff fell off his water skis in shallow 
water and successfully claimed that his accident was 
due to the incorrect placement of a sign in the water 
bearing the words ‘Deep Water.’ An engineer 
(employed by the Council) had placed the sign in that 
position following the dredging of a deep water channel 
nearby.  
 
In the Nagle decision it was appreciated by the High 
Court that ‘it may have been foolhardy or unlikely’ for a 
person to do what the plaintiff did, but it was, 
nonetheless, ‘not far-fetched or fanciful.’28 The decision 
sent shock waves through local authorities, and their 
insurers across WA. WA is a vast State with a vast 
coastline encompassing recreational areas that vary 
from the suburban to the most remote imaginable – all 
of which attract visitors (tourists), some of whom are 
bound to do foolhardy or unlikely acts. The title of this 
article comes from a letter to the editor of The West 
Australian newspaper after the decision was handed 
down, and reflects the sentiment of a large part of the 
community.29 It is worth making the point that no-one 
has anything but deep sympathy for the plaintiffs in 
these actions who have suffered appalling, life-
shattering injuries. The hard question relates to the 
circumstances in which the loss (in terms of financial 
cost) should be shifted from the plaintiff to some other 
party with a deeper pocket.  
 
The Ipp Report said that the problem with having a low 
threshold test for foreseeability (such as that posited in 
Shirt and Nagle) was that the lower courts would ignore 
the negligence calculus. The negligence calculus 
consists of the four factors mentioned earlier that are to 
be used in determining what action should be taken to 
 
28 Nagle v Rottnest island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423, per 
Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, 430-431. 
29 The West Australian, 29 December 1994, letter to the editor 
written by R. Stewart.  
prevent the foreseeable risk from eventuating. On this 
point the Ipp Report commented: 
 
[T]here is a danger that Shirt may be used to 
justify a conclusion - on the basis that a 
foreseeable risk was not far-fetched or fanciful 
- that it was negligent not to take precautions 
to prevent the risk materialising, and to do this 
without giving due weight to the other 
elements of the negligence calculus. It is also 
widely believed that this approach has brought 
the law of negligence into disrepute, and that it 
may have contributed to current difficulties in 
the field of public liability insurance.30
 
In recommending that the test for reasonable 
foreseeability be a risk that is ‘not insignificant’ the 
choice of a double negative was deliberate:  
 
The phrase ‘not insignificant’ is intended to 
indicate a risk that is of a higher probability 
than is indicated by the phrase ‘not far fetched 
or fanciful,’ but not so high as might be 
indicated by a phrase such as a ‘substantial 
risk’ … We do not intend the phrase to be a 
synonym for ‘significant.’ ‘Significant’ is apt 
to indicate a higher degree of probability than 
we intend.31  
 
The negligence calculus 
The Ipp Report recommended that the application of the 
negligence calculus should be included in the legislation 
as ‘[t]his might encourage judges to address their minds 
more directly to the issue of whether it would be 
reasonable to require precautions to be taken against a 
particular risk.’32 A brief look at some cases illustrates 
the operation of each factor in the negligence calculus. 
 
The probability of the harm occurring 
In Bolton v Stone33 the plaintiff (Miss Stone) was 
injured when struck by a cricket ball that was hit for a 
six out of the defendant’s cricket pitch. Cricket had 
                                                 
                                                
30 Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2002) Canberra, 
105 [footnote omitted]. 
31 Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2002) Canberra, 
105. 
32 Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2002) Canberra, 
106. 
33 Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850. 
been played on the ground for nearly a century, and 
although balls had been hit over the two metre high 
fence in the past, it was a rare occurrence. The fact of 
cricket balls leaving the ground was foreseeable, 
because it had happened in the past, but it had happened 
so rarely that the defendant had not been negligent in 
not taking precautions against the risk. Indeed it seemed 
that the only precaution available was to stop playing 
cricket there altogether.  
 
The likely seriousness of the harm 
In Paris v Stepney Borough Council34 the plaintiff (Mr 
Paris) was already blind in one eye when he 
commenced work with the defendant council as a motor 
vehicle mechanic. He was not provided with safety 
goggles. Paris was blinded in his good eye when a shard 
of rust entered it while he was hammering at a rusty 
bolt. For him the potential seriousness of the harm was 
greater than that for a person with sight in both eyes, 
and the defendant had fallen below the required 
standard of care. The provision of safety goggles would 
have been a simple measure to overcome the risk, and 
in the circumstances of the work should probably have 
been provided to all workers.  
 
The burden of taking the precautions 
This may be determined by assessing the expense and 
inconvenience to the particular defendant in preventing 
the risk from occurring. Bearing in mind the other 
factors (such as seriousness of the risk), a defendant 
with means, such as a company, might be differently 
treated to a defendant without means, such as an 
impecunious individual. In Caledonian Collieries Ltd v 
Speirs35 the husband of the plaintiff (the plaintiff being 
Mrs Speirs) was killed on a railway crossing by a 
runaway train wagon owned by the defendant. The 
defendant was found to have been negligent in not 
 
34Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367. 
35 Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs (1957) 92 CLR 202. 
installing safety mechanisms, even though the safety 
mechanisms posed a danger to the defendant’s 
employees. 
 
The social utility of the conduct that created the risk 
In Watt v Hertfordshire County Council36 the plaintiff 
(Mr Watt) was a fireman employed by the defendant. 
He was injured by an unsecured jack (a jaws of life 
mechanism) in the back of a utility in which he was 
traveling to an accident where an injured woman was 
trapped in a car. There was a vehicle set up specifically 
for the safe transportation of the jack, but it was out on 
another emergency call. The exigencies of the situation 
required the urgent transportation of the jack without 
waiting for the specialist vehicle to return, and Mr Watt 
was unsuccessful.  
 
Recreational activities 
The CLA 2002 makes specific reference to recreational 
activities in Division 4 of Part 1A. Recreational activity 
is defined in s 5E as: 
 
(a) any sport (whether or not the sport is an 
organised activity); 
(b) any pursuit or activity engaged in for 
enjoyment, relaxation or leisure; and  
(c) any pursuit or activity engaged in for 
enjoyment, relaxation or leisure at a place 
(such as a beach, park or other public open 
space) where people ordinarily engage in sport 
or in any pursuit or activity for enjoyment, 
relaxation or leisure. 
 
The definition comprehensively includes most activities 
that a tourist would be pursuing in Western Australia, 
and it would include circumstances such as those that 
gave rise to Nagle. Section 5H is headed ‘No liability 
for harm from obvious risk of dangerous recreational 
                                                 
                                                
36 Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 2 All ER 368. 
activities,’ and it applies whether or not the plaintiff 
knew of the risk.37 A ‘dangerous recreational activity’ is 
one that involves a significant risk of harm, and obvious 
risks are those that ‘would have been obvious to a 
reasonable person in the position of that person.’38 An 
obvious risk includes those that are patent or a matter of 
common knowledge, and can be obvious even though it 
is not ‘prominent, conspicuous or physically 
observable.’39 Furthermore, ‘[a] risk of something 
occurring can be an obvious risk even though it has a 
low probability of occurring.’40  
 
Section 5I is headed ‘No liability for recreational 
activity where risk warning,’ and this is a warning 
‘given in a manner that is reasonably likely to result in 
people being warned of the risk before engaging in the 
recreational activity.’41 The warning ‘can be given 
orally or in writing (including by means of a sign or 
otherwise).’42 The section applies only to persons 
engaging in the recreational activity voluntarily, and 
there are provisions relating to children.43 The 
defendant does not have to show that the plaintiff 
received or understood the warning, or was capable of 
doing so, although a risk warning to an incompetent 
person cannot be relied upon.44  
 
Contributory negligence 
Contributory negligence allows apportionment of 
damages. This means that the judge is able to reduce the 
damages by however much the plaintiff is deemed to 
have contributed to his/her own injury. Contributory 
negligence occurs where there is a failure by the 
plaintiff to meet the standard of care for his/her own 
protection and that failure is a legally contributing cause 
together with the defendant's negligent act in bringing 
about the injury. Division 5 of Part 1A, headed 
 
37 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5H(2). 
38 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5E & 5F(1). 
39 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5F(2) & (4). 
40 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5F(3). 
41 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5I(4). 
42 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5I(6). 
43 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5I(2), (3) & (11) 
44 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5I(5) & (13). 
contributory negligence, applies to all of Part 1A, and 
the required standard of care of the plaintiff ‘is that of a 
reasonable person in the position of that person.’45 If 
the plaintiff is intoxicated, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that he or she was contributorily 
negligent.46
 
Assumption of risk 
Assumption risk, as expressed in Division 6 of Part 1A, 
was included in one of the late amendments to the CLA 
2002, a matter that gave rise to some criticism in 
Parliament at the time.47 Section 5N is headed ‘Injured 
person presumed to be aware of obvious risk,’ ‘obvious 
risk’ having the same definition as that already 
discussed above, but the effect of the section is negated 
if ‘the person proves on the balance of probabilities that 
he or she was not aware of the risk.’48 The intention of s 
5N, as expressed in Hansard on 23 October 2003, is that 
‘the … statute will overturn the decision made in that 
case [Nagle], which is our prerogative as a 
Parliament.’49 However, the flaw in the provision was 
pointed out in Parliament: 
 
I would have thought that someone who was in 
a similar position to Mr Nagle … could argue 
that he had never been to Rottnest Island, had 
never stood on a similar rock, had never 
jumped into water in a similar environment, 
had no expectation or understanding that rocks 
were under water, had no way of knowing the 
risks that were involved and that no-one had 
ever taught him that such risks existed when 
jumping off a rock in similar circumstances. 
Bingo! I would have thought that proposed 
subsection (1) would apply and that the person 
would have found a legal loophole.50
 
Section 5O(1) provides that there is no duty to warn of 
an obvious risk, but this is limited by s 5O(2) which 
                                                 
                                                
45 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5K(2)(a). 
46 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5L. 
47 23 October 2003, Legislative Assembly Hansard, 12590 [Mr 
D.F. Barron-Sullivan]. 
48 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5N(1). 
49 23 October 2003, Legislative Assembly Hansard, 12592 [Mr 
M. McGowan]. 
50 23 October 2003, Legislative Assembly Hansard, 12593 [Mr 
D.F. Barron-Sullivan]. 
says the section does not apply if a plaintiff has 
requested advice or information from the defendant. 
Once again the potential legal pitfalls were debated in 
Parliament:  
 
Is it the case that if I am on someone’s 
premises or around facilities, all I need do is 
ask whether a risk is involved in order to 
provide myself with a future loophole? It 
means that any time someone goes to a facility 
with even the remotest risk he need only ask 
the owner or proprietor whether there is a risk. 
The provisions will not give an owner or 
proprietor too much comfort.51
 
Interestingly the corresponding recommendations in the 
Ipp Report are far more clearly articulated, and much 




In recognition of the difficulties that public authorities 
have in allocating resources, one of the terms of 
reference of the Ipp Panel was to consider the liability 
in negligence of such bodies, for example local 
councils, national park authorities and the like. The 
recommendation of the Ipp Report that there be a policy 
defence has been incorporated into the CLA 2002 
(which refers to public bodies rather than public 
authorities). The policy defence means that a decision 
based on policy, for example a decision made for 
financial or political reasons, ‘cannot be used to support 
a finding that the defendant was at fault unless the 
decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable public 
body or officer in the defendant’s position could have 
made it.’53  
 
As well, the CLA 2002 includes a list of principles 
relevant to the determination of whether or not the 
public body has fallen below the required standard of 
 
51 23 October 2003, Legislative Assembly Hansard, 12591-2 
[Mr D.F. Barron-Sullivan]. 
52 See for example Review of the Law of Negligence Report 
(2002) Canberra, Recommendation 32, 130. 
53 Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2002) Canberra, 
158, and Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5X. 
care. These include, inter alia, whether its functions are 
limited by the resources that are available to it, and 
these functions are to be assessed by looking at all of its 





It seems that the intention, and likely effect, of the CLA 
2002 will make it more difficult for potential plaintiffs 
(including tourists) to succeed in circumstances where 
they are accidentally injured, especially if they are 
engaged in a recreational activity at the time. The 
simple expedient of ensuring an appropriate warning 
sign is in place will shift the onus even further onto the 
plaintiff and away from the defendant. There are some 
areas, however, particularly in relation to ‘assumption 
of risk,’ that are likely to give rise to some 
unpredictable results in the future. It may well have 
been the government’s intention to overturn Nagle 
(bearing in mind that there was no warning sign at the 
time) – but only the passage of time will tell whether 
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